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ABSTRACT
A standard result from auction theory is that bidding truthfully
in a second price auction is a weakly dominant strategy. The re-
sult, however, does not apply in the presence of Cost Per Action
(CPA) constraints. Such constraints exist, for instance, in digital
advertising, as some buyer may try to maximize the total number
of clicks while keeping the empirical Cost Per Click (CPC) below
a threshold. More generally the CPA constraint implies that the
buyer has a maximal average cost per unit of value in mind.
We discuss how such constraints change some traditional results
from auction theory.
Following the usual textbook narrative on auction theory, we
focus specically on the symmetric setting, We formalize the notion
of CPA constrained auctions and derive a Nash equilibrium for sec-
ond price auctions. We then extend this result to combinations of
rst and second price auctions. Further, we expose a revenue equiv-
alence property and show that the seller’s revenue-maximizing
reserve price is zero.
In practice, CPA-constrained buyers may target an empirical
CPA on a given time horizon, as the auction is repeated many
times. Thus his bidding behavior depends on past realization. We
show that the resulting buyer dynamic optimization problem can
be formalized with stochastic control tools and solved numerically
with available solvers.
1 INTRODUCTION
What should you bid in a second price ad auction for a display
with a known click-through rate (CTR), for a given cost-per-click
(CPC)? The most probable (and possibly incorrect) answer is "CPC
times CTR". However, the right answer is "What do you mean by
cost-per-click?". Indeed, if the CPC is the maximal amount the
buyer is ready to pay for each click, the rst answer is correct. But
the story is dierent when CPC means the maximal average cost
per click.
In this article, we challenge the current modeling approach for
ad auctions. We argue that when some advertisers’ business con-
straints apply, the expected outcome of the auction may depart
from the traditional literature.
Advertising is a major source of revenue for Internet publishers,
and as such, is nancing a large part of the Internet. About 200
billion USD spent in 2017 on digital advertising (Kafka and Molla
2017). Banners for display advertising are usually bought through a
high frequency one unit auction mechanism called RTB (Real-Time
Bidding) by or on behalf of advertisers.
When a user reaches a publisher page, it triggers a call to an RTB
platform. The RTB platform then calls potential buyers, who have
a few milliseconds to answer with a bid request. This results in
an allocation of the display to a bidder, in exchange for a payment.
The allocation and the payment are dened by the rules of the
auction, which depends on the RTB platforms. The winner of the
auction can show a banner to the internet user. Yet, for many end
buyers, what really matters is not the display itself, but what will
result from it: clicks, conversions, etc... This is why empirical CPA
measures such as average cost per click (CPC) or average cost per
order (CPO) are of paramount importance.
The literature on display advertising auctions has been growing
over the last decade, pushed by the emergence of Internet giants
whose business models rely on digital advertising. One track of
research takes the seller’s point of view and focuses on how to build
"good" auctions, and relies on mechanism design theory (Balseiro
et al. 2015; Golrezaei et al. 2017), while the dual track brings the
buyer perspective under scrutiny, and focuses on the design of
bidding strategies (Agarwal et al. 2014; Cai et al. 2017; Diemert et al.
2017; Fernandez-Tapia et al. 2016; Zhang et al. 2014). The reader can
refer to (Roughgarden 2016) and (Krishna 2009) for an introduction
to auction theory.
Usually, in performance markets, the advertiser has a target
Cost Per Action (CPA) and/or a budget in mind. We will focus the
analysis on the CPA constraint. We will assume that the budget
constraint is absent or not binding. This topic of budget constraints
has already been addressed in the literature (Agarwal et al. 2014;
Balseiro et al. 2015; Fernandez-Tapia et al. 2016). The CPA is mea-
sured in term of the average quantity of money spent per action,
the action is a click, a visit, a conversion... For instance, if (a) we
are facing a competition uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, (b)
the CTR of every display is 0.5, (c) the auction is second price and
(d) we are ready to pay 1 USD on average for a click, then if we bid
0.5, we will win half of the time. For every display won, we get on
average half a click, and we pay 2
∫ 0.5
0 tdt = 1/4, thus our expected
CPC is 1/(4 ∗ 0.5) = 0.5 < 1. We should increase the bid to raise
the empirical CPC.
One reason for using CPA constraints instead of budgets con-
straints in performance markets is that if the campaign performs
well, there is no reason to shut it down at the middle of the month
because of a strict budget limit. Those constraints, implemented
by algorithms, can be modied by comparing the performances of
dierent channels.
Auctions with ROI constraints are a hot topic (Auerbach et al.
2008; Golrezaei et al. 2018; Wilkens et al. 2016). In particular (Gol-
rezaei et al. 2018) provide some empirical evidence that some buyers
are ROI constrained and propose an optimal auction design. Our
work departs from them because we use a dierent notion of ROI:
in the denition of CPA, we do not subtract the cost to the revenue
in the numerator. The reason to do so is that end buyers reason in
« cost per click » or « cost per order ». The numerator is not ex-
pressed in a unit of money and does not include the buyer payment
to the seller. Also, our focus is more buyer than seller oriented.
In this work, we focus on the buyers perspective, but we also
show on simple market instances that the CPA constraints may
impact the seller design, or give rise to undesirable competitive
behaviors.
This work brings several contributions to the table. First, we
introduce the buyer’s CPA constrained optimization problem and
exhibit a solution, then we nd the symmetric equilibrium in this
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setting and compare its properties with standard results from the
literature. In particular, no reserve price should be used. Last, since
in practice, the CPA is computed over a time window of repeated
auctions, we move the discussion to the dynamic settings for which
we explain why one can expect adaptive bid multipliers to provide
solutions close to the optimal for the buyer.
2 MODELING ASSUMPTIONS AND
NOTATIONS
We start by introducing the CPA-constrained bidding problem.
A seller is selling one item (a display opportunity in our context)
through an auction. The item brings a value vi to bidder i ∈ 1..n.
These values are independently distributed among bidders. For
example, in the context of the ad auction, v can be thought of as
the expected number of clicks (or sales) the bidder would get after
winning the auction. Thus, this value is not expressed in money but
in unit of action. We will see later how these values, expressed in
actions relates to bids, expressed in dollars. Let Fi be the cumulative
distribution and fi the density distribution of vi . For simplicity, we
assume the support of these density distributions to be compact
intervals.
When we take the viewpoint of bidder i , we denote by b−i the
greatest bid of the other bidders (the price to beat). We denote by дi
and Gi its density and cumulative distributions. Unless otherwise
stated, we also assume the auction to follow a second price rule,
with n > 1 bidders competing for the item.
Bidders with CPA constraints compare:
• the expected value they get in the auction
• the expected payment they incur.
We will refer to the CPA with the letter T because it is our
"targeted cost per something". We will denote by bi the bid of a
given bidder i of interest.
The bidder wants to maximize his expected value, subject to an
ex ante constraint in expectancy representing the targeted CPA.
The constraint is ex ante because, in practice, the same bidding
strategy is going to be applied repeatedly (or even simultaneously)
on several similar auctions. If for a random variable X , we denote
by [X ] ∈ {0, 1} the binary random variable that takes the value 1
when X ≥ 0, and 0 otherwise, then the expected value earned by
the buyer bidding bi is Ev,b− [b− < bi (v)]v . Here Ev,b− is there
expectation operator on the distribution of v and b−. Similarly the
bidder expected cost is Ev,b− [b− < bi (v)]b−.
We can now express the bidder optimization problem. The bidder
is looking for a bid function bi : [0, 1] → R+ solution of
max
b i
Ev,b−i [b−i < bi (v)]v, (1)
subject to Ev,b−i [b−i < bi (v)]b−i ≤ TiEv,b−i [b−i < bi (v)]v (CPA).
Observe that if we remove the constraint, the buyer would buy all
the opportunities no matter the cost. We pinpoint that problem
(1) is not equivalent to a budget constraint problem: we would
have had Ev,b−i [b−i < bi (v)]b−i ≤ budдet instead of the (CPA)
constraint. Nor is it equivalent to the maximization of the yield
Ev,b− (T iv − b−i )[b−i < bi (v)], as illustrated in the introduction.
We model the interactions among buyers with a game. Observe
that this game has constraints on the strategies prole. For a given
set of competing bidding strategies, a best reply of the bidder is
a solution of (1). A (constrained) Nash equilibrium is a strategies
prole with components that are best replies against the others .
In the following, the superscript i is often omitted to help readability.
3 BIDDING BEHAVIOR AND SYMMETRIC
EQUILIBRIUM
The main result of this section is the derivation of a symmetric
Nash equilibrium for an CPA constrained second price auction. We
then generalize this result to linear combinations of rst price and
second price auctions.
3.1 Second Price
Going back to the motivational example of the introduction, if a
buyer bidsTv , then he would pay at most T per unit of action. Since
he can increase his bid until he paysT per unit of action on average,
it is intuitive that he should bid higher than Tv to maximize the
criterion. The next theorem formalizes this idea.
Theorem 3.1 (Best Reply). For any bounded distribution of the
price to beat b−, there exists λ∗ ∈ R¯+ such that a solution of (1)
writes:
bi (v, λ∗) = (1/λ∗ + Ti )v . (2)
Lemma 3.2 (CPA monotony). If the bidder bids proportionally to
the value i.e. if there exists α such that b(v) = αv , then the CPA is
non-decreasing in α .
Proof. Fix u ∈ [0, 1], α > 0, then the expected cost knowing
that the value is v and the auction is won is
∫ αv
0 tд(t)dt , where
д is the probability density of the price to beat. This quantity is
increasing in α . Meanwhile the value is v . We get the result by
integration on v . 
If v1,v2, . . .vn are n independent draws from F , we denote by
v
(n)
i the average of the i
th greater draw (the ith order statistic).
Theorem 3.3 (Eqilibrium Bid). The unique symmetric con-
strained Nash equilibrium strategy is
bi
∗(v) = T
γ
v, (3)
where
γ (F ,n) = n
(
v
(n−1)
1
v
(n)
1
− n − 1
n
)
. (4)
Discussion. Theorem 3.1 is the answer to the introductory ques-
tion. Despite its simplicity, it shows something that is probably
overlooked: it may happen in a second price auction that the bid-
der’s optimal bid depends on the competition. Another useful
insight is that the bid is linear w.r.t. the value, which implies that
simple bid multipliers could be used optimally. Observe that the
result holds also for non-symmetric settings.
The proof relies on the strong incentive compatibility of the
second price auction in standard setting reinterpreted on the La-
grangian of the optimization problem. The parameter λ∗ should be
interpreted as the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the CPA
constraint.
Informally speaking, the harder the constraint, the bigger λ, the
smaller the bid. When λ is set to +∞, one bids only for displays
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that do not consume the constraint, while when λ goes to zero, the
bid diverges.
Lemma 3.2 is useful understand what is happening. Observe that
since the bid is linear w.r.t. the value and the objective increasing
in the bid multiplier, the optimal bid multiplier is the maximal
admissible one.
Theorem 3.3 is one of our main result. Observe that the com-
petition factor γ is only a function of the number of opponents
and F . Since it is smaller than one (see Appendix) the bid is pro-
portional to Tv with a factor greater than one. Compared with
the standard setting, the seller’s expected revenue is multiplied by
T/γ . The asymptotic value of γ , as well as other natural questions
concerning the equilibrium will be studied in Section 4. Note that
Theorem 3.3 is a necessary and sucient condition for a symmetric
Nash equilibrium, therefore it is unique, but we cannot claim that
we have identied the only Nash Equilibrium (see Section 4).
3.2 Generalization
We now generalize the argument to auctions which are convex
combinations of rst price and second price. We motivate this
extension by the existence in the industry of auctions which mix
together rst and second pricing rules, such as soft-oor.
If we denote by S(b,b−) the payment rule of the auction when
the buyer bids b and the best competing bid is b−, then we can make
the following observations: (1) for any s ≥ 0, S(sb, sb−) = sS(b,b−),
(2) S(b,b) = b, (3) S(b,b−) is the sum of a linear function of b and a
linear function of b−.
Consider a standard auction with payment rule S and symmet-
ric buyers with i.i.d. values distributed according to F (no CPA
constraints). Let bˆ be a symmetric equilibrium strategy in such
setting.
Theorem 3.4. The bid bi ∗(v) = Tγ bˆ(v) is a symmetric equilibrium
strategy, of the CPA constrained auction with payment rule S .
Example. : Consider a rst price auction with 2 buyer having
uniformly distributed values in [0, 1]. It is known (Krishna 2009)
that an equilibrium bid for a standard auction is v → 0.5v . By (16),
γ = 0.5. Thus an equilibrium bid for the CPA constrained auction
is v → Tv . Indeed: in rst price, we ensure the saturation of the
CPA constraint by bidding Tv .
4 PROPERTIES OF THE EQUILIBRIUM
Observe that the expected payment of a buyer is equal to his ex-
pected value times T. Since the total welfare is xed, the expected
payment of every buyer is the same no matter the auction. We
thus recover a standard result (Vickrey 1962) from auction theory,
adapted to CPA constrained auctions.
Theorem 4.1 (Revenue eqivalence). All the auctions described
in Section 3.2 bring the same expected revenue to the seller.
Proof. Using the proof of Theorem 3.3, we see that constraint
in (1) is binding at the symmetric equilibrium. Therefore the
payment of a buyer to the seller is equal to TEv[v > v−] =
TEmaxi ∈{1..n }(vi )/n. 
On the other hand, the following observation is quite unusual.
Figure 1: Potential outcomes (buyers’ prots and payments)
for dierent values of the bid multiplier in a symmetric set-
ting. Each curve corresponds to a dierent value of the re-
serve price. The equilibrium points are the intersections
of those curves with the line prot = T *payment. We took
T = 0.4, uniform distribution of values, and two bidders for
the numerical simulation.
Theorem 4.2 (Optimal Reserve Price). With CPA constraints,
the optimal reserve price in a symmetric setting is zero.
Explanation: a reserve price would decrease the social welfare,
and thus decrease the expected payment because of the CPA con-
straint.
Proof. Same idea as before: In the presence of a reserve price,
the constraint in (1) tells us that the buyer expected payment
is smaller than TEv[v > v−i ][v > r ], which is smaller than
TEv[v > v−i ] for r>0. Using the proof of Theorem 3.3 we see
that the constraint should be binding at the equilibrium, and thus
this last quantity corresponds to the expected payment when r = 0.
Thus the reserve price should be set to zero. 
We display in Figure 1 the results of a simulation that illustrates
Theorem 4.2. Observe that the proofs of the two last results rely
on the symmetry of the setting (same CPA target T , same value
distribution F ). We argue that this should not be seen as a limita-
tion of our results, because (a) Revenue Equivalence in the classical
setting also requires symmetry, (b) Theorem 4.2 provides a strik-
ing counterexample to the common belief that the reserve price
increases the revenue of the seller. We believe Theorem 4.2 to be
extendable to nonsymmetric setting, as long as one can guarantee
that the CPA constraint is binding.
This completely departs from the idea that reserve prices should
be used to increase the seller’s revenue. Observe that in practice
in the case of display advertising, the buyer may take some time
to react to a change of empirical CPA. Consequently, measuring
the seller’s long term expected revenue uplift is a technical and
business challenge. Moreover, the reserve price, by decreasing the
welfare, may on the long run trigger an increase of the target CPA,
since buyers have to do an arbitrage between volume and CPA.
Last but not least, we do not claim that reserve prices should be
set to zero for CPA constrained bidders in all situations. A trivial
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counterexample to such claim is embodied by a setting with only
one buyer and no competition.
Theorem 4.3 (Convergence). For any number of biddersn,γ (F ,n) ≤
1. Moreover if the value v is bounded, then
lim
n→∞γ (F ,n) = 1 (5)
Proof. Let us denote by Y (k ) the maximum of k random vari-
ables drawn with the distribution F . One just need to observe
that
γ (F ,n) = 1 − E(v − Y
n−1 |v > Yn−1)
v
(n)
1
. (6)

This can be interpreted in the following way: when there is a
great number of bidders, the competition is such that the payment
tends to become rst price.
Remark 1. There may be a nonsymmetric equilibrium.
The basic idea is that one bidder can bid higher than necessary
to force another bidder to leave the auction because his (CPA)
constraint cannot be satised.
Proof. We concentrate on exhibiting a counter-example. Take
n = 2,T = 1, F is the uniform distribution over [2, 3], and denote by
(αi )i=1,2 the bid multipliers of the two buyers. Set α2 = 6. Then if
α1 ≤ 4, buyer 1 does not win any auction, but the (CPA) constraint
is satised.
On the other hand, if α1 > 4, then the cost vs value ratio is
bigger than 4, and the (CPA) constraint is violated. We can check
that if α1 = 0 the (CPA) constraint is satised for 2. Therefore
(α1,α2) = (0, 6) is an asymmetric Nash equilibrium. 
In addition to this, observe that the buyers may be tempted to bid
other strategies than the linear best reply. For example consider this
example: Take n = 2, an exponential distribution with parameter
1, T = 1. One buyer may increase its prot by bidding with an
ane function. Compare (b1(v1),b2(v2)) = (2v1 + 1, 2v2) with
(b1(v1),b2(v2)) = (3v1, 3v2).
On a simulation with 108 auctions, we get in the rst case an
empirical CPA of 0.92, and a revenue of 0.84 for bidder 1 (resp. 1.0
and 0.61 for bidder 2), while in the second case, we get an empirical
CPA of 1, and a revenue of 0.75 for bidder 1 (resp. 1.0 and 0.75
for bidder 2). Those simple, informal examples indicate that the
bidders may be tempted to bid aggressively to weaken the other
bidders CPA.
5 DYNAMIC BIDDER PROBLEM
In practice, the buyer behaviors may dier from the static case:
(1) the buyer can adapt his bidding strategy to the past events, (2)
the linear constraint (CPA) does not reect the buyer risk aversion,
(3) the benet the buyer gets from a won auction is stochastic (for
example, if he is only interested in clicks or conversions), (4) from a
business perspective, there is a trade-o between CPA and volumes
in the buyer mind. This trade-o can be expressed in dierent
ways.
We propose in this section a continuous time optimal control
framework to express and study the buyer’s problem in a dynamic
fashion. The approach combines the advantages of a powerful and
mathematically clean expressiveness with theoretical insights and
numerical tools.
We refer the reader to (Pham 2009) for a reference on stochastic
control, and to (Falcone and Ferretti 2013) for a presentation of the
numerical methods involved. The User Guide (Bonnans et al. 2015)
provides a hands-on presentation of the topic.
We only model one individual buyer. Yet note that the optimal
control formulation is the rst building block for the study of the
full market dynamics (with mean eld games(Carmona and Delarue
2013; Guéant et al. 2011) or dierential games(Isaacs 1999)). Our
main discovery in the stochastic case is that (a) the optimal bid
is not linear in the value anymore, but (b) we can still reasonably
propose a linear bid (at the cost of an approximation to be discussed
thereafter).
5.1 Deterministic Dynamic Formulation
We use the deterministic case to introduce some notations, and
recover with optimal control tools some of the results we already
derived with the static model. Indeed, when we neglect the stochas-
tic aspect of the reward, the problem is very similar to the static
one.
We consider a continuous time model. The buyer receives a
continuous ow of requests. The motivation to propose a contin-
uous time model is that it makes the theoretical analysis easier
(Heymann et al. 2018; Pham 2009).
We denote by R the instantaneous revenue and by C the instan-
taneous cost:
R(b) = Ev[b− < b(v)], and (7)
C(b) = Eb−[b− < b(v)], (8)
If we denote by τ the time horizon, the bidder is now maximizing
with respect to b ∫ τ
0
R(bt )dt , (9)
subject to ÛXt = TR(bt ) − C(bt ), Xτ ≥ 0 and X0 = x0.
The state Xt represents the (CPA) constraint is should be pos-
itive at t = τ for the (CPA) constraint to be satised. We use the
Pontryagin Maximum Principle to argue that a necessary condition
for an optimal control is that there exists a multiplier p(t) so that
b(t) maximizes H = p(TR − C) + R. Moreover Ûp = − ∂H∂x = 0. We
thus recover the main result of the static case: the bid is linear in v .
Moreover in the absence of stochastic components, the multiplier
is constant. Observe that in practice, one could use the solution of
problem (9) to implement a Model Predictive Control (MPC), using
x0 as the current state and thus get an online bidding engine.
5.2 Stochastic Formulation
The number of displays is much higher than the number of clicks/sales,
therefore we neglect the randomness of the competition/price over
the randomness that comes from the actions. Because of the number
of displays involved, we argue that by the law of large number, the
uncertainty on the action outcome can be apprehended a white
noise. We thus add an additional, stochastic term in the revenue:
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TσidWt , whereWt is a Brownian motion. We get that an optimal
bid b should maximize (see (Pham 2009) for a reference)
Eb−,v [b > b−]((Tv − b−)p +v + T2σ 2M), (10)
for some p and M .
Since the realization of the action follows a binomial law, σ ∝
v(1 −v). Assuming v << 1, we can approximate it as v . Therefore
every innitesimal terms of the Hamiltonian becomes ((Tv−b−)p+
v +vMT2)[b > b−] reproducing the previous reasoning we get
b∗ = v(T + MT
2 + 1
p
). (11)
Conclusion: Once again, the bid factor approach is justied! Ob-
serve that this conclusion comes from an approximation, (therefore
the bid is not strictly speaking optimal for the initial problem), but
by doing so, we have reduced the control set from R+ → R+ to R+.
This reduction gives access to a well understood approach to solve
this kind of problem: the continuous time equivalent of Dynamic
Programming.
Observe that our problem denition is incomplete: we need
to take into account the constraint on the nal state. We restate
this constraint with a penalty K(X ). Using the dynamic program-
ming principle, the buyer problem is equivalent to the following
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:
Vt + sup
α
(
(TR(α) − C(α))Vx + T
2
2 R(α)Vxx + R(α)
)
= 0 (12)
and Vτ = K , (13)
with
R(α) = R(v → αv), and (14)
C(α) = C(v → αv) (15)
5.3 Numerical Resolution
Our aim here is to illustrate that HJB approaches provide powerful
numerical and theoretical tools to model the buyer’s preferences.
A quantitative comparison of the performance of the stochastic
method is out of the scope of this article.
We solve an instance of the problem with the numerical optimal
stochastic control solver BocopHJB (Bonnans et al. 2015). BocopHJB
computes the Bellman function by solving the non-linear partial dif-
ferential equation (HJB). Observe that the state is one dimensional,
which makes this kind of solver very ecient.
We take G(b−) = (b−)a on [0, 1] and v uniformly distributed on
[0, 1]. We get that R(α) = αaa+2 if α < 1 and R(α) = α
a
(a+2)(αa+2) +
1
2 (1 − 1α 2 ) otherwise, similarly, C(α) = aα
a+1
(a+1)(a+2) for α ≤ 1 and
C(α) = a(a+1)(a+2)α ((a + 2)α − a − 1) for α ≥ 1 (see Figure 2). We
take T = 0.8 and a linear penalty for negative Xτ . The result of a
simulated trajectories is displayed in Figure 3(a).
We see that on this specic instance of the stochastic path, the
control is decreased at the end of the time horizon to adapt to the
sudden spike of CPA. This is the kind of behavior we can expect
from a stochastic controller. By contrast, a constant multiplier may
result in the kind of trajectories displayed on Figure 3 (b).
(a) a=1
(b) a=5
Figure 2: R and C and empirical T for two values of a
6 CONCLUSION
We have formalized the existence of CPA constraints in the buyers
bidding problem. These constraints are of paramount importance in
performance markets, yet they tend to be neglected in the current
literature. We have seen how standard results translate into this
context, sometimes with surprising insights. We also envisioned
the dynamic, stochastic setting by combining a rst-order approxi-
mation with the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman approach. This allowed
us in particular to derive a numerical method.
This work raises questions that deserve more extended study.
In particular, can we generalize the rst three theorems to other
constraints, auction rules and settings? Can the existence of the
aggressive behaviors pointed out at the end of Section 5 pose a
problem to the market? One may also want to put under scrutiny
the harder, but more realistic case of correlated values. The dynamic
case also deserves a specic study.
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A EXAMPLES
A.1 Power Law Case: derivation of the
competition factor
We take F (v) = va over [0, 1] with a > 0. We get that v(n)1 = anan+1 .
Therefore we can write v
(n−1)
1
v (n)1
= n−1n
an+1
a(n−1)+1 , which leads to
γ (a,n) = (n − 1)
(
an + 1
a(n − 1) + 1 − 1
)
. (16)
We observe that γ is increasing in n and a. It converges to 1 as n
(or a) goes to innity. A plot of γ is displayed in Figure 4(a).
Remark: If we consider the 2 bidders case, and denote by α > 0
and β > 0 their respective bid multipliers, then the payment and
expected value of the rst bidder are respectively equal to
pi = β(α
β
)a+2 1(a + 2)(2a + 3) , and V =
(αβ )a+1
(a + 1)(2a + 3) . (17)
We see that the CPA of the rst bidder does not depend on the
second bidder strategy. Therefore, we have in this case something
similar to a strategy dominance.
A.2 Numerical estimation of the competition
factor
The trick is to remark that γ is equal to the ratio of cost and value
when T = 1. We derive the following algorithm to estimate γ for
dierent F and n:
(1) Choose n, F and a number of samples N
(2) Cost = 0; Value = 0;
(3) Generate v ∼ F and v− ∼ Fn
(4) If v > v− then: Cost+ = v− and Value+ = v
(5) Repeat from 3. (N-1) times
(6) γ ≈Cost/Value
The results are displayed in Figure 4. For the log-normal distri-
bution, the results are similar to those of the power distribution:
monotony and convergence to 1. It seems that the bigger the vari-
ance, the bigger γ . Without providing a proof, we see that we can
get an insightful intuition from Equation 6 of the next section.
The exponential distribution provides more exotic results: γ
seems to be only a function of n (i.e. independent of the scale
parameter). This can be easily proved analytically using the formula
E(max(v1,v2)) = 1λ1 +
1
λ1
− 1λ1+λ2 and a recursion on v
(n)
1 . It is
however still increasing in n, and seems to converge to 1 as n goes
to innity.
B PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
Set b(α ,v) = αv for α > 0. If b(α ,v) is admissible for any α , then
we can set λ = 0 and we are done (edge case). Else, there exists α+
such that γ (α+) > 0, where γ (α) := Ev [b−i < b(α ,v)](b−i − Tiv)
Moreover:
(1) since α →
∫ 1
b−i /α (b−i −Tiv)f i (v)dv is continuous for any
b−i > 0, so is γ ,
(2) for α smaller than T i , γ (α) ≤ 0.
So there exists α∗ satisfying γ (α∗) = 0.
(a) Power Distribution
//
(b) Exponential Distribution
(c) LogNormal Distribution
Figure 4: The scaling factor as a function of the distribution
parameter, for dierent numbers of bidders
If we set λ∗ so that 1λ∗ +T
i = α∗, then by strategic dominance
of the truthful strategy in a second price auction, b(α∗,v) solves
the unconstrained optimization problem of maximizing
Eb−,v [b− < b](v − λ∗(b− −T iv)). (18)
We can also assert that b(α∗, .) is also an optimal solution for
the constrained optimization problem (1). Why? First observe that
b(α∗, .) is admissible since γ (α∗) = 0, second, let bˆ be an optimal
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solution to (1), then, if we write k(b) = Eb−,v [b− < b]v , we have
that
k(b(α∗)) − λ∗γ (α∗) ≥ k(bˆ) − λ∗Ev [b−i < bˆ](b−i − Tiv) (19)
thus since γ (α∗) = 0 and Ev [b−i < bˆ](b−i − Tiv) ≤ 0
k(b(α∗)) ≥ k(bˆ). (20)
C PROOF OF THEOREM 3.3
To derive the rst order condition, we follow the same path as in
the proof of Theorem 3.4. We thus only discuss the uniqueness. We
start with a small technical consideration: observe that the bids can
be modied on a zero measure set without impacting the prot. So
when we say unique, we ,in fact, mean essentially unique.
We denote by b a symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy. It
induces a distribution G of the price to beat. It is clear that we
cannot be in the edge case envisioned in the previous proof. So
take α∗ as introduced in the previous proof. Observe that to be a
best reply b has to maximize (18). Assume there exists v0 such that
αv , b(v) on a neighborhood V of v0. Since д(b(v)) > 0 for v ∈ V ,
αv is strictly dominating b(v) in the optimization of (18), which is
a contradiction.
D PROOF OF THEOREM 3.4
First observe that, the Lagrangian of the bidder optimization prob-
lems writes:
λEv,b− ((1/λ + T)v − S(b(v),b−)) [b > b−],
thus we can look for a point-wise maximizer. Denote by (bˆ, bˆ−) the
equilibrium bid of the same auction without any CPA constraints.
Observe that if the price to beat is distributed like (1/λ + T)bˆ−(v−)
(for a given λ > 0), then:
b∗(v) = argmaxbEv− (1/λ + T)v − S(b,b−(v−))
= (1/λ + T)argmaxbEv− (1/λ + T)v − S((1/λ + T)b, (1/λ + T)bˆ−(v−))
= (1/λ + T)argmaxbEv−v − S(b, bˆ−(v−))
= (1/λ + T)bˆ(v).
Therefore, for a given λ, if the competition uses the proposed linear
bid, one should also bid linearly to maximize the Lagrangian. We
denote by G the price to beat distribution and by κ the degree of
"second priceness": S(b,b−) = ((1 − κ)b + κb−)[b > b−]. Observe
that the rst term of the integrand in the Lagrangian denition is
equal to EvbλG(bλ). So, let us deal with the second term. Since
Ev,v−S(bλ(v),b−(v−))[v > v−] = Ev
∫ bλ (v)
0
S(bλ(v), t)д(t)dt
= EvS(bλ(v),bλ(v))G(b) −
∫ bλ (v)
0
κG(t)dt
= EvbλG(bλ) −
∫ bλ (v)
0
κG(t)dt ,
we get that
L = λκEv
∫ bλ (v)
0
G(t)dt .
The rst order condition on λ writes
0 = Ev,b− ((1/λ + T)v − S(b(v),b−)) [b > b−] − κ/λEvG(bλ(v))vdv .
Then using successively the homogeneity of S , a simplication by
κ, and the de facto denition of γ as λT/1+λT, we get
γ =
Ev−[v > v−]
Ev[v > v−] ,
which we simplify using the following formula on the order statis-
tics (see (Krishna 2009)): EY (n)2 = EnY
(n−1)
1 − (n − 1)Y
(n)
1 .
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